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Postanarchist kink in the speculative fiction 
of Octavia Butler and Samuel Delany 
Lewis Call 
It's a beautiful universe ... wondrous and the more exciting because no one has 
written plays and poems and built sculptures to indicate the structure of desire I 
negotiate every day as I move about in it. 
-Samuel Delany, Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand 
The problem of power is one of the major philosophical and political 
preoccupations of the modern West. It is a problem which has drawn the 
attention of some of the greatest minds of the nineteenth and twentieth cen­
turies, including Fried~ich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. I have argued else­
where that the philosophies of power articulated by Nietzsche and Foucault 
stand as prototypes of an innovative form of anarchist theory, one which finds 
liberatory potential in the disintegration of the modern self and its liberal 
humanist politics (Call 2002: chs 1 and 2). Lately this kind of theory has 
become known as postanarchism. For me, postanarchism refers to a form of 
contemporary anarchist theory which draws extensively upon postmodern and 
poststructuralist philosophy in order to push anarchism beyond its traditional 
boundaries. Postanarchism tries to do this by adding important new ideas to 
anarchism's traditional critiques of statism and capitalism. Two of these ideas 
are especially significant for the present essay: the Foucauldian philosophy of 
power, which sees power as omnipresent but allows us to distinguish between 
power's various forms, and the Lacanian concept of subjectivity, which 
understands the self to be constituted by and through its desire. 
Postanarchism implies and includes a crucial sexual anarchism. Indeed, the 
disruption of conventional forms of sexual identity is one of the most powerful 
moves available to the postanarchist. When postanarchism's anti-essentialist 
critique is applied to sexuality, the result is queer. When that critique is 
applied to power, the result is kinky. Postanarchism enables a system of erotic 
ethics suitable for an age beyond humanism. That system endorses radical 
relations of erotic power up to and including consensual play-slavery. This 
dramatic form of erotic power exchange mimics the structure of slavery~ but in 
a way which produces radically different subjective meaning for the partici­
pants: unlike slavery, play-slavery can be ethical and erotic. Postanarchism 
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suggests that ethical structures of erotic power (including those of play­
slavery) may actually sap the authority of their non-consensual Doppelgangers. 
I have used the term 'kink theory' to describe the body of work which explores 
the ethical possibilities of consensual erotic power exchange (Call 2007). I now 
wish to argue that when kink theory encounters postanarchism, the result is 
something new and interesting: an ethical position and a strategy for political 
action, which I propose to call postanarchist kink. 
This essay examines elements of postanarchist kink in the speculative fiction 
of two African American authors, Octavia Butler and Samuel Delany.l The 
work of Butler and Delany is centrally concerned with the political and ethical 
problems of slavery. These two authors provide what amounts to a traditional 
anarchist critique of the historical American slave system. However, their 
work also endorses erotic power exchange, including forms which seem to 
replicate the structures of slavery. Their remarkable novels suggest that an 
erotic play-slavery based upon consent and mutual desire may help us over­
come the crippling legacy of chattel slavery. In their most radical moments, 
Butler and Delany demonstrate that erotic power exchange can facilitate a 
breakdown of the traditional political subject; furthermore, they show that 
this breakdown is potentially liberating. As Sherryl Vint has recently observed, 
Butler and Delany are 'authors whose critical engagement with questions of 
sexuality and power pushes the boundaries of the current social configuration' 
(Vint 2009: 402). The novels of Butler and Delany suggest, counterintuitively 
but convincingly, that one way out of capitalist political economy may lead 
through the S/M dungeon: a kinky postanarchism. 
The body of theory which I call postanarchist kink was born in the 1980s, 
alongside queer theory. In 1984, The Advocate published a groundbreaking 
interview with Michel Foucault entitled 'Sex, Power, and the Politics of Iden­
tity'. Foucault emphasised the anarchist aspects of queer politics: 'being 
homosexuals, we are in a struggle with the government, and the government is 
in a struggle with us' (Foucault 1984: 167). This bold, oppositional stance 
would become one of the defining features of queer theory, and Foucault's 
crucial contributions to that body of theory are well known. Yet Foucault's work 
supports more than one radical theory about sexuality. Even as he helped to 
create queer theory, he simultaneously contributed to a related critical dis­
course, which I have been calling kink theory. The latter discourse studies 
the set of practices known collectively· as BDSM: bondage/discipline (B/D) , 
dominance/submission (D/S) and sadomasochism (S/M). Through its study of 
these practices, kink theory attempts to theorise the consensual exchange of 
erotic power. Kink theory interprets such power exchange as a viable ethical 
alternative to the non-consensual power structures which permeate the 
modern world. 'What strikes me with regard to S&M', said Foucault, 'is 
how it differs from social power' (ibid.: 169). Foucault argued that social 
power 'is a strategic relation which has been stabilized through 
institutions', while S&M 'is a strategic relation, but it is always fluid' (ibid.). 
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For Foucault, kink was important because it showed that even in a world where 
power is omnipresent, some of that power flows in accordance with an ethics 
of freedom. Anarchists should be very interested in the possibility that this 
ethical, erotic power might be deployed as a symbolic challenge to the forms 
of social, economic and political power against which they struggle. 
Certainly the modern liberal state has taken a strong interest in kink. Foucault's 
fellow kink theorist Gayle Rubin noted that the state goes to great lengths to 
delegitimise S/M in particular, largely by asserting that those who practice S/M 
are 'legally incapable of consenting' to such practices (Rubin 1984: 305).2 
So the state tries to contest S/M on precisely the same theoretical terrain where 
anarchism attacks the legitimacy of that state: the terrain surrounding the 
concept of consent. This struggle over the meaning of consent suggests that 
consent means one thing to the state and something very different to anarchists 
and kinksters. Wendy Brown has argued compellingly that within liberalism 
consent marks the presence of a power to which one submits (Brown 1995: 
162-3). Thus the liberal form of consent actually 'marks the subordinate status 
of the consenting party' (ibid.: 163). Clearly, liberal consent could not provide 
the basis for ethical power relations, since this kind of consent requires and 
presumes radical inequalities between the parties. In the liberal model, an 
immensely powerful entity (the state) seeks consent from those who possess 
little if any power (political subjects, or citizens). Thus, as Brown argues, lib­
eral consent is 'a response to power - it adds or withdraws legitimacy - but is 
not a mode of enacting or sharing in power' (ibid.). 
Here we may draw a sharp line between liberal consent and the kind of consent 
which enables relations of erotic power exchange. The structures of erotic consent 
are deeply informed by desire, particularly embodied desire. This is rarely, if ever, 
the case with the structures of political consent which enable modern liberal 
states or with the forms of economic consent which underwrite modern 
capit;lism. The consent of the liberal political subject or the capitalist economic 
subject can be grudging, indifferent or apathetic. Relations of erotic power, by 
the same token, require desire. Mutual desire guarantees the ethical content of 
erotic power exchange, for desire ensures that the needs and wishes of the 
'subordinate party' will be taken fully into account. In Lacan's famous general 
formulation, 'man's desire is the desire of the Other' (Lacan 1981: 38). Kinky 
relations provide a particularly striking example of this. In a typical BDSM 
relationship, the dominant desires the desire of the submissive. The submissive's 
desire frequently structures negotiations and determines the shape and extent of 
the scene. By endorsing and emphasising the desire of the submissive, BDSM 
promotes a high level of equality between the participants. This equality may 
sometimes lie hidden behind the apparent inequality generated by the BDSM 
roles themselves, and confusion around this issue may motivate many moral 
critiques of kink (Highleyman 1997: para. 10). A form of consent which pro­
motes such equality, and which fully respects the desires of all parties involved, 
could be compatible with anarchism, while the liberal form of consent cannot. 
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Perhaps the practices of kinksters, and the concept of desiring consent which 
stands behind those practices, represent a real challenge to the modern state 
and its political theories. Some anarchists have already begun to recognise this 
possibility. A 2002 issue of Organise!, the magazine of Britain's Anarchist 
Federation, called for 'safe, free, diverse and consensual' sex. The magazine 
ran an 'Interview with an Anarchist Dominatrix', one Mistress Venus. Mistress 
Venus clearly understands how to wield symbolic power against the dominant 
order. She defines the domination session as an 'escape from reality' (Anarchist 
Federation 2002: 8). But this does not appear to be a nihilistic 'escape' into 
non-reality. Rather, it looks very much like an attempt to critique the symbolic 
order of modern capitalism. Mistress Venus does this by developing an alter­
native symbolic order, one in which symbols of power are redeployed in sub­
versive ways. If this strategy is successful, these redeployed symbols may 
challenge or undermine the authority of the conventional symbolic order. 
Mistress Venus suggests that 
the roles we play mirror the power-based capitalistic society we live in today, 
a society of greed, oppression and subversion, a society of force, silence 
and pain. This is in no way representative of the lifestyle I choose to live 
in as an anarchist, a society based on equality, respect and self-government. 
Domination is a game, the adult's version of what children call 'playing'. 
(Anarchist Federation 2002: 8)3 
Here Mistress Venus acknowledges the crucial contribution which kink can make 
to anarchism. As she points out, kink reflects the non-consensual, real world 
power relations which anarchists universally condemn. Yet this reflection is 
always consensual, desired and playful. Kink performs real world power rela­
tionships in a way which simultaneously critiques those relations and offers a 
vital ethical alternative. As Liz Highleyman argues, S/M role-playing can be 
used 'to challenge illegitimate authority. Most SM players believe that such 
play is a parody of real world authority rather than an imitation of it' (High­
leyman 1997: para. 24). The strategy here is to reproduce the structure of real 
world power relations, but to do so in a way that will radically alter the sub­
jective significance of those relations. The idea, in Highleyman's wonderful 
formulation, is to 'subvert, pervert, and make overt the erotic subtext of 
power and authority' (ibid.: para. 27). This has the potential to reduce the 
psychological power of real world authority, and surely that is a step in the 
direction of anarchist liberation. 
If it is to realise this potential, however, postanarchist kink must be careful 
not to slip back into a liberal humanist philosophy or politics. Judy Greenway 
has argued that 
even when sexual transgression seems to be about creating new versions of 
sexuality, the language of the true inner self recurs ... Sometimes, for 
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instance in the debates around the limits of consensual sado-masochism, 
its defenders use the traditional rhetoric of civil liberties, maintaining the 
publidprivate distinction. 
(Greenway 1997: 8) 
Indeed, this does represent a serious potential problem for postanarchist kink 
theory. The risk here is that kinky desire might inadvertently produce a pro­
blematic kind of identity politics. This politics would depend for its very 
existence upon the liberal humanist subject and the liberal state, both of which 
postanarchism seeks to subvert. Wendy Brown has formulated this problem 
quite effectively. Her analysis convincingly suggests that identity politics 
cannot possibly be deployed against the modern state. Brown argues elo­
quently that 'politicized identities generated out of liberal, disciplinary socie­
ties, insofar as they are premised on exclusion from a universal ideal, require 
that ideal, as well as their exclusion from it, for their own continuing existence 
as identities' (Brown 1995: 65). If Brown is right about this, then a kinky 
identity politics will be of little use to anarchism. 
The source of this problem is desire; more specifically, it is the troubling 
way in which identity politics seem to channel desire within a liberal order. 
Thus Brown speaks of 'politicized identity's desire within liberal-bureaucratic 
regimes, its foreclosure of its own freedom' (ibid.: 66). For Brown this is a 
reactionary desire, one which grows out of a kind of Nietzschean ressentiment. 
Brown emphasises the 'structure of desire fueling identity-based political 
claims' (ibid.: 62). I believe that this term 'structure of desire' (also used by 
Delany) provides the key that may unlock kink's radical potential. Specifically, 
I suggest that we must strive to distinguish the reactionary structure of desire 
which Brown has ably identified from a very different structure of desire. The 
structure I have in mind would describe the desire of postmodern subjects: 
deeply embodied, without fixed or stable identities. The identities of these 
subjects would fluctuate too rapidly and too dramatically for identity 
politics to emerge. This would also be a structure of kinky desire. As Jamie 
Heckert has observed, the 'poststructuralist argument on the potential fluidity 
of the self' suggests that S/M could be used to 'redefine the meaning of power 
play', though Heckert rightly warns us that this project may not be for every­
one, and that it should only be pursued with great care and caution (Heckert 
2005: 208-9). The concept of fluidity is crucial here: kink has the potential to 
add flexible, fluid power relations to the fluid identity structures which post­
structuralism has identified. 'SM roles are so fluid', observes Highleyman; '[a]n 
SM role is not predetermined on the basis of one's occupation, gender, sexual 
orientation, race, or class, and each partner may take on the role(s) that 
meet their individual or collective desires' (Highleyman 1997: para. 25). Simi­
larly, Foucault points out that in S/M there are roles, but these-.can be 
reversed; even when the roles are stabilised, they are clearly part of a game 
(Foucault 1984: 169). 
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Certainly many kinksters identify with particular posltIons within the 
structure of erotic power relations. Many claim specific identities for them­
selves, often introducing themselves as tops or bottoms, dominants or sub­
missives, masters or slaves. But many also switch (at least in my experience). 
Here desire takes priority over specific roles or identities. Within such a 
structure of desire, identities and power relations are in a constant state of 
flux. Because the stable subject required by liberal humanism cannot emerge 
from this structure of desire, I call it postanarchist. 
Postanarchist kink sees power not as a problem but as a possibility. Foucault 
showed us that the attempt to eliminate power is absurd. Rather than attacking 
power, we might draw careful distinctions between different kinds of power. 
We should entertain the hypothesis that it is, after all, possible to exercise 
power in an ethically responsible way. Indeed, as Highleyman astutely 
observes, 'the idea that we can use SM to learn to use power in an ethical way 
remains, along with consent, the crux of the moral defense of erotic dom­
inance and submission' (Highleyman 1997: para. 38). The key to this ethical 
possibility is to be found in the philosophy of consent and desire embodied in the 
practices of erotic power exchange. According to this philosophy, the exchange 
of power is ethically legitimate if and only if all persons involved consent to 
that exchange and desire it. These criteria permit erotic power exchange 
to stand as a dramatic ethical alternative to non-consensual, undesired power. 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the crucial differences between 
these two forms of power, I will examine a body of literature which addresses 
both forms: the speculative fiction of Octavia Butler and Samuel Delany. These 
two African American authors are deeply aware of the massive historical 
traumas which have resulted from the exercise of non-consensual political and 
economic power, particularly in the American South prior to the Civil War. 
(As a white male American, I experience these traumas much less directly and in 
a very different way. As a postanarchist historian, I believe that we can learn 
from these traumas.) Butler and Delany are especially aware of the problems 
of sexual exploitation endemic in the American slave system, an awareness they 
share with other well-known African American authors like Toni Morrison 
and Alice Walker.4 But Butler and Delany go further than many of their peers, 
for they not only provide a compelling critique of the political and sexual econo­
mies of slavery, they also provide an alternative. For Butler and Delany, erotic 
power exchange and play-slavery provide an antidote to the ethically bankrupt 
institution of slavery. These two authors thus offer us a way to begin healing the 
wounds which chattel slavery has left upon our culture and its philosophy of ethics. 
Becoming a kind of master: postanarchist kink 
in Octavia Butler's Patternist books 
As an African American woman who writes science fiction, Octavia Butler 
speaks from a triply marginalised subject position. She is a woman writing in a 
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field which is dominated by male authors. She is an African American writing 
in a field dominated by white authors. And by choosing to write science fic­
tion, she has elected to participate in a field which is itself marginal to litera­
ture - a 'paraliterary' field, to use Delany's terminology. Since this last 
marginalisation, at least, represents a choice on Butler's part, we must consider 
the possibility that she wants to speak from the margins. Indeed, it is possible 
that Butler has things to say which can be said only at the margins. Butler's 
work deals with themes of power and slavery - hardly unusual concerns for an 
African American writer. But by choosing to write science fiction, Butler gives 
herself the opportunity to approach these themes in a way which is radically 
different from the approaches of mainstream literature. Certainly we find in 
Butler a compelling and elegant critique of socio-economic slavery, and of the 
forms of power which sustain that system. But there is also another kind of 
power at work in Butler's writing. Lauren J. Lacey argues quite convincingly 
that 'Butler's last three novels [Parable of the Sower, Parable of the Talents 
and Fledgling] work through the complexities of power in ways that offer 
possibilities for contemporary feminists - and others - to cope with and even 
to profit from the power formations that surround us' (Lacey 2008: 380). 
While Lacey is right to say that Butler's later novels show us the positive 
political possibilities of power, this theme is not a new one for Butler. It can 
also be found in her earliest published work, the Patternist series. 
Butler quite rightly rejects the sort of power which produced master-slave 
relations in the antebellum American South. In her Patternist series, she describes 
these relations in terms which will make sense to a largely white science fiction 
audience who may not be entirely familiar with the political economy of slav­
ery. Butler accomplishes this by locating her slave society in a future world 
which is ruled by a group of powerful telepaths. These telepaths share access 
to a grid of mental energy known as the Pattern. The Pattern is strictly hier­
archical. This hierarchical structure makes the Pattern a tempting target for 
anarchist critique, which Butler deploys without naming it as such. The 
strongest telepath within the Pattern is known as the Patternmaster, and this 
individual has the ability to exercise non-consensual telepathic control over the 
other Patternists. The Patternmaster delegates power to Housemasters, who 
also use their power in a non-consensual way. Butler describes a Housemaster 
called Coransee as someone who 'radiated power in the way of a man not only 
confident but arrogant' (Butler 1976: 15). 
The parallels between these Housemasters and nineteenth-century American 
plantation owners are unmistakable. Housemasters are in general very com­
petitive, yet they 'had a tradition of returning one another's runaways' (ibid.: 75). 
Like their real world counterparts, Housemasters recognise that they share a 
common interest in maintaining the slave system. The Housemasters also 
reproduce the reprehensible gender relations of the plantation economy. It 
was, of course, common practice in the American South for slavemasters to 
rape their female slaves, in order to ensure the reproduction of the slave 
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population. Similarly, Housemaster Coransee knows that 'no woman of his 
House had the right to refuse him' (ibid.: 158). For women Patternists espe­
cially, non-consensual, undesired power is the very essence of the Pattern. And 
yet these Patternist women yearn for precisely the same kind of power which 
has traditionally been used against them. 'I want the same thing you want', 
says a Patternist woman named Amber; 'My House. Mine' (ibid.: 134). One of 
the most painful truths about non-consensual power is that those who are 
victimised by such power often respond by dreaming not of a liberated and 
egalitarian society, but of a world in which that power flows through their 
hands instead of the hands of their masters. This psychological aspect of the 
slave system makes it fairly simple to divide the slave population and turn the 
slaves against one another. Distinctions are drawn in Butler's Houses between 
the more prestigious household slaves and the lower-ranking 'outsiders'. This 
closely parallels the distinction between house and field slaves in the ante­
bellum American South. Starved of power, the outsiders often abuse the only 
people who are below them in the Patternist social hierarchy: those who lack 
telepathic powers altogether, the 'mutes'. For example, 'there was an outsider 
who had researched ancient methods of torture and made a hobby of trying 
them on mutes' (ibid.: 68). 
The mutes are clearly an important part of the slave system which the Pat­
ternist series describes. In the profoundly hierarchical structure of the Pattern, 
they are the lowest of all groups. Their inequality is largely based upon their 
lack of telepathic power (which stands in Butler's work as a surrogate for 
unequal levels of economic power in the American South). But the most honest 
of Butler's characters understand that this inequality is also linguistic in origin. 
Consider this conversation between the immortal shape-shifting woman Emma 
(also known as Anyanwu) and Doro, patriarchal progenitor of the Pattern: 
'Mutes!' 
He looked annoyed, probably with himself. 'It's a convenient term. 
People without telepathic voices. Ordinary people.' 
'I know what it means, Doro. I knew the first time I heard Mary use it. 
It means nigger!' 
(Butler 1977: 161) 
Although the Pattern is the result of an extended breeding programme carried 
out by the immortal Doro, he is, ironically, a mute. However, Doro does have 
the ability to transfer his mind into another person's body. In doing so, he 
permanently extinguishes that person's consciousness. Doro has lived for mil­
lennia in this way, hopping from one body to another, 'consuming' the minds 
which inhabit these bodies. Not surprisingly, Doro emerges in Butler's narra­
tive as the ultimate slavemaster. He can kill at will, but he cannot be killed. 
His power is absolute and unquestionable. He is also completely unconcerned 
about the pain of others. 'It was rare for another person's pain to disturb 
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Doro. If the girl seemed to be dying, he would be concerned that good seed 
was about to be lost. But if she were merely in agony, it did not matter' 
(Butler 1980: 184). Indeed, Doro derives sadistic pleasure from the act of kill­
ing, especially when his victim is mentally or telepathically sensitive. Doro 
explains that he is able to recognise 'the kinds of people that I would get the 
most pleasure from if I took them. I guess you could say, the kinds of people 
who tasted best' (Butler 1977: 97). Thus Doro is not merely a sadist; he is a 
kind of psychic cannibal who enjoys consuming the mental energy of his victims. 
But there is also another motivation for Doro's cruelty: 'Doro wanted an 
empire. He didn't call it that, but that was what he meant ... He needed tools, 
because an empire of ordinary people wasn't quite what he had in mind' (ibid.: 
92-3). Doro's slaves are his tools. He uses them to enhance and increase his 
political power. Yet there is another form of power which is even more 
important to Doro. Foucault called it 'bio-power', that which 'brought life and 
its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations' (Foucault 1978: 143). 
Just as a nineteenth-century American slave owner would always be concerned 
about the size of his 'herd', Doro is obsessed with his breeding programme. 
'Had human life ever mattered to Doro beyond his interest in human husban­
dry?' (Butler 1977: 55). In this context, Doro's power is largely biological in 
origin, since he controls the breeding programme. But again, Butler reminds us 
that power is always partly linguistic. 'Breed didn't sound like the kind of 
word that should be applied to people. The minute he said it, though, I rea­
lized it was the right word for what he was doing' (ibid.: 96). Doro's breeding 
programme is partly enabled by language's reluctance to name it as such. So 
Butler combines a radical critique of bio-power with an almost structuralist 
critique of linguistic power: her project has clear Foucauldian affinities. 
Like any slavemaster, Doro regards the children born to his 'breeders' not as 
people but as his property. 'The daughter had been his from the moment of 
her conception - his property as surely as though his brand were burned into 
her flesh. She even thought of herself as his property' (Butler 1980: 150). 
Doro's dehumanising breeding project thus exhibits all the worst features of 
nineteenth-century American slavery. 
But, as Foucault reminds us, 'there are no relations of power without resis­
tances' (Foucault 1980: 142). The nineteenth century was a time not only of 
slavery but of slave revolts. In the Patternist books, these revolts arrive in the 
person of Mary, the protagonist of Mind of My Mind. Mary is the end result 
of Doro's breeding programme. It is her telepathic power that establishes the 
Pattern itself. Her relationship with Dora ranges from tense to antagonistic, 
and much of this antagonism stems from Mary's resentment of Doro's power: 
'What am I for, Doro? What are you progressing toward?' 
'You know the answer to that.' 
'Your race, your empire, yes, but what place is there in it for me?' 
. (Butler 1977: 101) 
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As Mary joins with other telepaths to form the Pattern, her power increases 
dramatically. One of the first to notice this change is Mary's husband Karl, a 
strong telepath who had once dominated Mary: 
'You're changing. I've been watching you change, wondering how far you 
would go.' 
'Changing how?' 
'Growing up perhaps. I can remember when it was easier to intimidate 
you.'· 
(Butler 1977: 188) 
Gradually Doro, too, comes to realise that he can no longer control Mary as 
he once did. Indeed, as a mute, Doro remains shut out of the Pattern. 'Toge­
ther, the "Patternists" were growing into something that he could observe, 
hamper, or destroy but not something he could join' (ibid: 155). Naturally, this 
necessitates a war between Doro and Mary. Doro is immensely powerful, 
but Mary is more powerful still, for she has the strength of her Patternists to 
draw upon. Mary does not merely have power, 'she was power, strength con­
centrated as Doro had never felt it before - the strength of dozens, perhaps 
hundreds of Patternists' (ibid.: 217, emphasis added). In the end, even 
Doro can't stand against such strength. At the conclusion of Mind of My 
Mind, Doro is himself enslaved, then extinguished: 'He was a member of the 
Pattern. A Patternist. Property. Mary's property ... She consumed him slowly, 
drinking in his terror and his life, drawing out her own pleasure, and laughing 
through his soundless screams' (ibid.: 220). This is a dramatic, ironic reversal 
of fortune for a man who has been enslaving and consuming others for 
millennia. 
As satisfying as it surely is to see the tables turned on Doro, however, we 
cannot assume that Mary will be able to escape the temptations of non­
consensual power. She may be destined to become a female Doro. The tendency 
among feminist critics, however, has been to argue otherwise. Marleen Barr 
maintains that Mary 'uses her power to create a new community, a new body 
of men and women' (Barr 1987: 77). Similarly, Robin Roberts suggests that 
Mary is a kind of nurturing 'queen bee' whose community-centred values 
make her preferable to the patriarchal Doro (Roberts 1993: 107). Unfortu­
nately, we don't really know for certain how Mary's regime will compare to 
that of Doro. Her rule is established at the very end of Mind ofMy Mind, and 
develops within the narrative gap which exists between that book and Clay's 
Ark. But we may reasonably imagine that Mary - a former slave herself - at 
least has the potential to feel sympathy for those she dominates, as Doro could 
not. And Butler does show us enough of Mary's relationship with the Patter­
nists in Mind of My Mind to convince us that Mary does genuinely care for 
her telepaths, that she sees them not as breeding stock but as members of a 
vibrant organic community. Still, we cannot ignore the fact that while Mary's 
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regime may be more nurturing and more organic than Doro's, it remains a 
non-consensual slave system nonetheless. Members of the Pattern have no 
choice but to participate, and all are forced to acknowledge Mary's absolute 
power. . 
It is only in the final volume of the Patternist series, Wild Seed, that Butler 
shows us an egalitarian relationship based upon the exchange of erotic power. 
Though Wild Seed was one of the last books to appear in the Patternist series, 
it represents the beginning of the narrative which runs through that series. 
(The tension between these two sequences - publication and narrative - is one 
way in which Butler's work refuses the too-convenient comforts of linear 
narrative.) Wild Seed tells us of Doro's origins, and of his centuries-spanning 
power struggle with the immortal shape-shifting woman called Anyanwu. 
That this is a political struggle is clear; Stacy Alaimo has described it as 'a 
battle between two modes of knowing and being: the tyrannical force of an 
egotistical, disembodied mind and the transformative powers of an utterly 
embodied woman' (Alaimo 1998: 126). In one sense, then, this is the story of 
the postmodern body's revenge upon the Enlightenment's mythology of human 
subjectivity. But Wild Seed is much more than that. It is also an account of the 
ways- in which power and desire flow between Doro and Anyanwu. It is, in 
short, a sadomasochistic love story. 
Like any dominant, Doro finds that what he wants more than anything 
else is Anyanwu's submission. Lacan might say Doro desires the desire of 
the Other. The problem is that Anyanwu is 'wild seed'. She is a genetic aber­
ration, and not the product of Doro's selective breeding programme. She is 
thus quite difficult to control, but Doro hopes that, 'like no other wild seed, 
Anyanwu would learn to fear him and bend herself to his will' (Butler 1980: 90). 
He will settle for nothing less than total obedience. Anyanwu must even learn 
to define ethics in Doro's terms. 'She would learn that right and wrong were 
what he said they were' (ibid.: 92). Yet, time and time again, Doro is fru­
strated in his quest to gain power over Anyanwu. She remains untameable. 
'What will I have to do next to teach you to obey?' Doro laments (ibid.: 176). 
When Anyanwu finally does begin to submit, it is only because her instincts of 
self-preservation are strong. She knows that Doro could kill her; to protect 
herself, she submits. This is not (yet) an ethical or erotic submission: she sub­
mits out of necessity, without desire. Thus 'Doro had reshaped her. She had 
submitted and submitted and submitted to keep him from killing her ... 
she had formed the habit of submission' (ibid.: 196). But that is not all she 
develops. Anyanwu comes to enjoy Doro's attentions: 'Anyanwu enjoyed 
his touches even now when she thought they were more imprisoning than 
caressing' (ibid.: 94). In short, she learns to eroticise the power relations which 
exist between her and Doro. By doing so, she alters the basic nature of their 
relationship. 
The erotic power which begins to flow between Anyanwu and Doro 
becomes entirely distinct from the ethically problematic forms of power which 
142 Lewis Call Structures of desire 143 
Butler described in the previous Patternist books. One crucial difference is that 
these power relations are based upon reciprocal desire. Another important 
difference is that they are reversible. Here the joke, as always, is on Doro. 
From the very moment that Doro attains erotic mastery over Anyanwu, he 
begins to develop what Hegel called a 'dependent consciousness'.5 Doro is 
enslaved by his desire for Anyanwu, by his all-consuming need to dominate the 
one woman who could possibly be his equal. It takes Doro several centuries 
and an entire novel to realise that this is happening to him. Anyanwu, how­
ever, articulates her strategy on page 9 of Wild Seed: 'She knew some people 
were masters and some were slaves. That was the way it had always been ... 
She had become a kind of master herself. "Sometimes, one must become a 
master to avoid becoming a slave," she said softly' (ibid.: 9). This, then, is the 
dance which these two immortals perform through the centuries: 'mastering' 
and 'enslaving' one another in a permanent spiral of mutual desire. 
The culmination of the erotic relationship between Anyanwu and Doro 
occurs near the end of the novel. In a scene which is deeply charged with erotic 
energy, Doro feeds upon Anyanwu's life essence, taking her as close to death 
as he can without killing her. The scene reveals the depths of Doro's desires, 
and the extent to which he is controlled by those desires: 
'I had to know you that way at least once,' he said. 'I had to touch you 
that way.' 
'Why?' she asked. 
'Because it's the closest I'll ever come to you.' 
(Butler 1980: 259) 
This remarkable kinky love scene highlights the importance of mutual, con­
sensual desire. Doro 'wondered what she would say if he told her no one had 
ever before enjoyed such contact with him. No one in nearly four thousand 
years ... But Anyanwu had participated, had enjoyed, had even taken the 
initiative for a while, greatly intensifying his pleasure' (ibid.: 260). For millen­
nia, Doro has been a psychic rapist, consuming people's consciousness against 
their will. Now he is astonished to discover that what he really wants and 
needs is not an unwilling victim but a partner, someone who genuinely enjoys 
the exchange of power and can participate in that exchange as an equal. Here 
is the supreme irony: Anyanwu has made the ultimate submission to Doro. She 
has offered him her life. And yet by doing so, she has gained total power 
over him. Through the reciprocal, consensual exchange of power and desire, 
Anyanwu has accomplished something truly remarkable. She has reappro­
priated slavery, and transformed it from an ethical abomination into some­
thing beautiful. She has discovered a kind of erotic play-slavery. Wild Seed 
presents this play-slavery as an effective strategic and symbolic challenge to 
Doro's ugly, empire-building slavery. A text would have to be kinky and 
postanarchist to achieve something like that. 
A land of wholly inverted values: postanarchist kink 
in Samuel Delany's Neveryon books 
Like Butler, Samuel Delany speaks from the literary and erotic margins. 
Indeed, many of his most interesting· ideas can be articulated only from a 
position which is marginal to mainstream literature and sexuality. Those 
interpretations of Delany's work which fail to recognise this are doomed to 
remain incomplete. In her frequently cited essay on 'Recent Feminist Utopias', 
for example, Joanna Russ makes the rather astonishing claim that Delany 
writes from an 'implicit level of freedom' simply because he is male (Russ 
1981: 83). Russ chooses to disregard the ways in which Delany, a gay African 
American who writes S/F about S/M, is automatically relegated to the margin 
of the margins. As science fiction, Delany's texts are marginal to literature. 
There is a subtle but persistent concern for race in Delany's work, and this is 
certainly enough to make his project marginal to that of white literature. His 
elaborate articulation of gay themes makes his writing marginal to hetero­
sexual literature. And his frequent discussions of S/M make his work marginal 
to vanilla literature. By focusing only on Delany's gender, Russ disregards these 
important margins. Damien Broderick gets a bit closer; he recognises that, as a 
gay black man, Delany does write about marginal experience (Broderick 
1995: 120). And yet Broderick still does not give us a complete picture of 
Delany's work. He ends up suggesting, rather implausibly, that Delany's 'fic­
tion is articulated about a semiotic programme which seems, at its limit, to 
merge with humanist, albeit highly relativist, liberal pluralism' (ibid.: 138). This 
misconception stems from the fact that Broderick acknowledges some of the 
margins which Delany occupies (gay/black) but disregards another (kinky). 
This is an essential omission, for it is precisely Delany's commitment to the 
principles of erotic power exchange that makes his work incompatible with the 
tradition of liberal humanism. Humanism has amply demonstrated that it has 
room for a great many different identities, including those of ethnic minority 
groups and possibly even homosexuals. But it has not, so far, shown that it 
has any room for kink, and the one thing it has not yet learned to tolerate is 
frank discussions of power. Delany's work points us not towards any liberal 
humanism (however pluralist), but rather towards a kinky postanarchism. 
Delany is a deeply political thinker, with a strong sense of ethics. Nowhere 
is this more clear than in his philosophy of kink. The cornerstone of Delany's 
system of erotic ethics is a principle of consent informed by desire, which is 
something that his system has in common with many anarchist ethical philo­
sophies. In a number of ways, in a variety of different texts, Delany makes this 
fundamental point: desired and consensual forms of power exchange are ethi­
cally acceptable and potentially erotic; undesired, non-consensual forms of 
power are intrinsically unethical and non-erotic. Delany is especially careful to 
articulate the vital distinction between erotic and political power: 'To'·assume 
a session of "sexual torture" between two consenting adults requires only 
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minimal reorganization of what goes on in an actual session of political 
torture - and in any way manifests the same "power relations" - signs only 
gross ignorance of the context and the substance of both situations!' (Delany 
1994: 140). It is ethics, of course, which separates the two situations. In Stars 
in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand, Delany highlights and sharpens this ethical 
point by describing a world in which 'all sadomasochism was hunted out and 
punished with barbaric singlemindedness; especially if concert [sic] was writ­
ten out or clearly specified by verbal contract, which their authorities con­
sidered the ultimate disease' (Delany 1984: 215). Reading this passage, one 
experiences a remarkable ethical vertigo: why should consensual S/M be 
repressed in particular? What is it about such practices that the state might 
find so troubling? Perhaps it is the fact that consensual erotic power exchange 
threatens the state's jealously guarded (and non-consensual) power monopoly. 
That would be a very anarchist interpretation. 
Like Butler, Delany provides extensive meditations qn slavery. And like 
Butler, Delany understands that 'slavery' can refer either to a non-consensual 
set of socio-economic relations or to the consensual eroticisation of such rela­
tions. (This eroticisation represents a particular form of the more general 
practice of erotic power exchange.) Indeed, 'slavery' is a slippery signifier 
which can sometimes slide back and forth between the two meanings. Delany's 
Gorgik is a character who has experienced both real slavery and play-slavery; 
he seems to feel that one can lead to another: 'Fire, slavery, cloth, coin, and 
stone - these are the basis of civilized life. Sometimes it happens that one or 
another of them gets hopelessly involved in the most basic appetites of a 
woman or a man' (Delany 1979: 143). But Delany also recognises that the 
eroticisation of class relations represents a potentially potent threat to the domi­
nant social order: 'The easier it is to name, survey, and pathologize the erotici­
zation of any particular set of class relations, then the more dangerous that set 
of relations - and their eroticization - is to patriarchal status quo phallocentric 
society' (Delany ·1994: 136). S/M eroticises the class relations which are such a 
fundamental part of chattel slavery; by this logic, S/M must be one of the most 
dangerous forces ever unleashed against the patriarchy. For no erotic practice 
has been more thoroughly catalogued, more ruthlessly medicalised. From 
Krafft-Ebing's vast nineteenth-century inventory of perversions to today's 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, erotic power exchange 
has remained one of psychology's great obsessions.6 It's no wonder that the 
patriarchy has done everything within its considerable power to control the 
discourse surrounding S/M, for as long as S/M remains trapped within the 
psychiatric discourse, the threat which it represents is contained. 
Clearly, Delany is fascinated by the politics of kink, and he has devoted 
considerable paraliterary effort to the exploration of these politics. Erotic 
power relations are at the thematic core of the multi-volume sword and 
sorcery epic which Delany initiated in 1979 with Tales of Neveryon. Delany 
tells us that it was in these stories that he 'turned to examine some of the real 
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(i.e., again, I mean political) problems that the idea of S/M brings up' (Delany 
1999: 118). And it's clear that this exploration has a deep personal significance 
for him. 'Should you really want to know what this weird Delany guy is all 
about, these are the books to wrestle with', Delany assures us (ibid.: 119). But 
why did Delany choose the much-maligned genre of sword and sorcery fantasy 
as the forum in which to speak about ideas which are clearly so important to 
him? He recognises that sword and sorcery is 'SF's despised younger cousin' 
(Delany 1994: 46). Indeed, he goes out of his way to emphasise that sword and 
sorcery represents 'the margin of the margin' (ibid.: 71). Perhaps, then, Delan.y 
chose sword and sorcery precisely because it is marginal - indeed, because It 
exists on the margins of an already marginal paraliterary genre called science 
fiction. After all, such a doubly marginal genre is perfect for a discussion of 
that most marginal of sexual strategies, erotic power exchange. By choosing 
sword and sorcery, Delany is not merely accepting marginal status. He is 
insisting upon it. 
Like almost all of Delany's books, the Neveryon stories draw very clear 
lines between non-consensual socio-economic power and consensual, desired 
erotic power. Delany is especially careful to distinguish slavery from play­
slavery. Neveryon is a slave society, and Neveryon's slave system reproduces 
the power relations of the antebellum American South, down to the last detail. 
Delany is careful to emphasise, for example, the special status of the favoured 
administrative ('house') slaves, who in Neveryon wear ornate covers over their 
iron slave collars as a sign of relative rank. Of course, these elite slaves must 
contend with the inevitable feelings of guilt and complicity which result from 
their collaboration with slavery. Collar covers 'add far more weight to the 
neck than the circle of iron they cover', observes one house slave (Delany 1979: 224). 
Delany uses the symbol of the collar cover to illustrate the morass of moral 
dilemmas which slavery inevitably produces. 
In order to ensure that the Neverjion series can describe the entire his­
tory of slavery, Delany employs a clever technique of narrative acceleration. 
Historical developments which took centuries in the real world take dec­
ades in Neveryon. This allows characters to comment on broad historical 
transformations. Some of these characters are able to describe the problems 
that emerge when slaves are emancipated. 'Freedom is not so simple a 
thing as that', a house slave points out when confronted with possible liberation. 
'Where do you expect us to go? If we leave here, what do you expect will 
happen to us?' (ibid.: 221). Here Delany recognises that the transition from a 
traditional economy based on chattel slavery to a market economy based on 
formally free wage labour will not be an easy one. The former slaves who 
join the ranks of the impoverished urban working class may find that their 
lives have not improved. Indeed, another house slave argues that 'you free 
the labor pens into a world where, at least in the cities and the larger 
towns, a wage-earning populace, many of them, is worse off than here' 
(ibid.: 225). 
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Despite these potential (and, in the case of American history, very real) 
problems, many citizens of Neveryon are willing to fight for the abolition of 
slavery, under the leadership of a former slave known as Gorgik the Liberator. 
Delany makes it easy to see why slavery arouses such intense anger. The ethical 
atrocities which result from this kind of non-consensual socio-economic power 
are clear, particularly when Delany examines the sexual dimension of the slave 
system. In Neveryon, as in the antebellum American south, slavery encourages 
rape and other forms of sexual abuse. Long before he begins his campaign 
against slavery, Gorgik (not yet 'the Liberator') visits the slave market. 'Buy 
me, lord!' begs a woman slave. 'You will take me, please, away from him! We 
go to the desert tribes and I'll be sold there again. Do you know what they do 
to women slaves in the desert? I was there before. I don't want to go back' 
(ibid.: 135). Surely few moral crusades could be more inspirational than the 
campaign to end to such violations. 
And yet the same narrative which contains this thorough critique of socio­
economic slavery also includes a very sympathetic portrayal of consensual, 
desired play-slavery. Gorgik does not buy the woman at the slave market. 
Instead, he purchases a slave boy called Small Sarg. Sarg suggests that Gorgik 
should have bought the woman instead, for he could have had her work by 
day, her body by night. Gorgik replies, 'you think I'll get any less from you?' 
(ibid.: 137). At first, this sounds like another example of non-consensual sexual 
slavery. But in fact the relationship between Gorgik and Sarg is far more 
complex than that. The first time Gorgik approaches Sarg sexually, he informs 
Sarg that the boy must wear a slave collar this time, but that on another night 
Gorgik will take the collar off Sarg and put it on himself (ibid: 143). It turns 
out that Gorgik's sexuality is directly linked to the symbol of slavery. It 
doesn't matter to him which partner wears the collar, because the roles are 
reversible, as they often are in S/M (Foucault 1984: 169). The specific power 
configuration of Gorgik and Sarg's first encounter seems quite arbitrary: 
Gorgik refuses to wear the collar himself only because he does 'not feel like 
wearing it ... at least tonight' (Delany 1979: 143). 
Even if we read the first encounter between Gorgik and Sarg as non­
consensual, this aspect of their relationship seems to last no longer than one night. 
The next morning, Sarg awakes to find Gorgik asleep, the collar off. Sarg slips 
away and could easily have escaped. He finds a girl hiding in the bushes; the 
first thing she says to him is 'you're not a slave now' (ibid.: 145). Perhaps to 
emphasise this, Delany has the girl repeat this point twice more: 'you are a 
slave no longer' and 'you are not a slave any more' (ibid.: 148). This triple 
invocation, formulated a bit differently each time, suggests that Sarg has 
indeed left socio-economic slavery behind. He chooses to stay with Gorgik, 
shares desire with him and fights by his side. Gorgik does sometimes wear the 
collar; when he does, he calls Sarg 'little master' (ibid.: 234). When Gorgik 
tries to explain the nature of their relationship to others, he claims that 'we are 
both free men' (ibid.: 237). The reality, however, is that neither is free, for they 
are both enchained by mutual desire. By participating in a kind of play-slavery, 
Gorgik and Small Sarg reappropriate the symbolic structure of the socio-economic 
slavery which they hate, and use that structure to fulfil their erotic needs. 
Certainly, Delany is well aware of the explosive danger which is contained 
within such play-slavery. In Nevery6na, the second volume of the Neveryon 
series, Small Sarg turns against Gorgik. 'Before you sits a man whose every 
word and act is impelled by lusts as depraved as any in the nation, who would 
make a slave of all and anyone to satisfy them, calling such satisfaction free­
dom!' says Sarg of his former lover (Delany 1983: 77). We don't know what, 
exactly, caused Sarg to reject the relationship which he once shared with 
Gorgik; these developments occur 'off-stage', outside Delany's narrative. But 
the fact that Sarg was able to leave Gorgik is important. As Highleyman 
observes, a play-slave 'has an out', and this is one thing that makes his situa­
tion very different from that of African American slaves in the nineteenth 
century (Highleyman 1997: para. 16). Sarg tries to kill Gorgik, but Sarg himself 
is killed in the ensuing conflict. Yet even though Small Sarg has just tried to 
kill him, Gorgik will allow no ill to be spoken of his former lover. 'But that 
man, dead on the tile, was also a friend - once', Gorgik declares. 'Had his 
friendship not been so great, his hatred might have been less' (Delany 1983: 87). 
Gorgik still remembers Sarg fondly, and even Sarg's betrayal is not enough to 
dissuade Gorgik from his campaign to bring ethics to power. As always, 
he continues this campaign on two simultaneous fronts, waging a guerrilla 
campaign against the institution of slavery while also deploying erotic power 
relations as a dramatic ethical alternative to that institution. Flight From 
Neveryon, the third volume in the series, finds Gorgik in another kinky rela­
tionship, this time with a one-eyed former mine slave called Noyeed. Gorgik 
and Noyeed develop their relationship consciously, with great deliberation and 
care. 'What we do together, you and I,' says Noyeed, 'we do very much 
awake' (Delany 1985: 123). Noyeed and Gorgik recognise the dangers inherent 
in a relationship such as theirs, and they are mindful of the example of 
Small Sarg. Nonetheless, they still choose erotic play-slavery, as a liberating 
alternative to the socio-economic slave system which they fight by day. 
I must, therefore, strongly contest the interpretation advanced by Robert 
Elliot Fox. In his study of sexual politics in Delany's work, Fox asserts that 
one of the things which is so thoroughly repulsive about the master/slave 
relationship in sado-masochism is that it is a psychosexual parody of a 
relationship (which, to be sure, had its own psychosexual aspect) invol­
ving large masses of people, not just individuals, under conditions of the 
most overt compulsion. 
(Fox 1996: 52) 
Here Fox completely fails to grasp the nature of consensual, desired play­
slavery. On Delany's worlds and moons, this type of 'slavery' represents a 
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liberation precisely because it replaces a non-consensual form of slavery ­
which both liberals and anarchists would probably find repulsive - with a 
form of play based upon consent and mutual desire. In the land of Neveryon, 
it is not the radicalness of Gorgik's campaign against the institution of slavery 
that bothers the ruling class (since that institution was dying anyway, of 'nat­
ural' economic causes); '[r]ather, it was the radicalness of his appearance that 
had bothered the nobles, merchants, and their conservative employees - not 
the Liberator's practice so much as his potential; for appearances are signs of 
possibilities' (Delany 1985: 9). We cannot afford to discount the significance of 
this point, because the Neveryon books, like much of Delany's writing, operate 
within a semiotic system which is informed by the poststructuralist theories of 
people like Foucault. Within such a semiotic system, the most significant poli­
tical acts are likely to occur not on the material level of political economy, but 
on the level of sign and symbol. In this respect, as in many others, Delany's 
work is postanarchist. Jes Battis has recently noted the specifically kinky 
valence of Gorgik's semiotic system: 'it is through S/M sexuality ... that 
Gorgik stages political interventions within the gendered order of his own 
world' (Battis 2009: 480). A semiotic system like this demands that we take 
seriously arguments such as the one that Gorgik advances: 'As one word 
uttered in three different situations may mean three entirely different things, so 
the collar worn in three different situations may mean three different things. 
They are not the same: sex, affection, and society' (Delany 1979: 238). By 
developing this radically contextual theory of semiotics and symbolism, 
Gorgik (and Delany) resolve the apparent contradiction which Fox believes he 
has identified. The symbolic redemption of slavery from the semiotic and 
ethical abyss in which it lingers is a crucial part of Delany's project. Jeffrey 
Allen Tucker is right to suggest that 'Gorgik became a revolutionary who 
sought to attain for himself and all slaves in Neveryon the power to wrest 
symbolic control of the slave collar from the aristocracy and the freedom 
to shift the significance of the collar from one context to another' (Tucker 
2004: 148). This is the apex of Delany's kinky poststructuralist anarchism: 
freedom is defined here as the power to create context, the right to signify freely. 
But if we wish to observe the full realisation of Delany's theory of erotic 
power, we must Return to Neveryon. In a book by that name (originally 
published as The Bridge of Lost Desire in 1987), Delany brings his philosophy 
of power as close to a conclusion as such an open-ended theoretical project 
could come. In 'The Game of Time and Pain', a tale set shortly after the lib­
eration of Neveryon's slaves, we learn that S/M is 'one of the more common 
perversions in a Neveryon so recently awakened from a troubling dream of 
slaves' (Delany 1987: 24). Here Delany makes explicit the historical connection 
between non-consensual socio-economic slavery and its consensual erotic 
reflection. This connection might seem to have ominous ethical implications 
for play-slavery. But here it is crucial to consider Delany's philosophy of his­
tory. In Return to Neveryon, he assures us that history, 'despite our masters, is 
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never inevitable, only more or less negotiable' (ibid.: 34).7 Delany goes on to 
argue that history must 'be founded as richly on desire as on memory' (ibid.: 74). 
His argument points towards a radically subjective form of history - indeed, it 
suggests a kind of Lacanian history. After all, Lacan saw desire as the Freudian 
version of the Cartesian cogito: the 'nodal point' where subjectivity occurs 
(Lacan 1981: 154). Delany's work suggests that history is experienced by this 
desiring subject.8 But what might such a negotiated, subjective, desiring history 
look like? Clearly, such a history would involve what Nietzsche called a 
'revaluation of all values' (Nietzsche 1969: 254, 310-13). Thus Delany's Gorgik 
dreams of 'a land of wholly inverted values where the very sign of my 
servitude, the iron at my neck, would be taken by all I met as a symbol of 
transcendent freedom' (Delany 1987: 34). 
For Gorgik and for other citizens of Neveryon, such an inversion of values 
is inherently political. For us it is anarchist: as always, the relevant politics are 
the politics of consent and desire. Delany's storytelling emphatically demon­
strates that non-consensual socio-economic slavery cannot be erotic. Gorgik 
recalls an erotic moment which he experienced when he was still a slave. 
Temporarily uncollared, Gorgik watched an aristocrat place a slave collar 
around his own neck - and Gorgik felt desire. But when the aristocrat dis­
covered that Gorgik was watching, he quickly moved to re-collar the slave. 
Gorgik speaks of the collar: 'And just as I had recognized the sexual in his 
placing of it about his own neck, I knew that, though lust still reeled in 
his body and still staggered in mine, this gesture was as empty of the sexual as 
it is possible for a human gesture to be' (ibid.: 54). The fundamental realisa­
tion that no reconciliation is possible between socio-economic slavery and 
play-slavery sets Gorgik on the path to true knowledge and true freedom. For 
this is what Gorgik learned that night in the aristocrat's tent: 'I knew, at least 
for me, that the power to remove the collar was wholly involved with the 
freedom to place it there when I wished. And, wanting it, I knew, for the first 
time since I'd been brought to the mines - indeed, for the first time in my life­
the self that want defined' (ibid.: 57). Here Gorgik is announcing a rather 
remarkable epistemological revolution. It is a revolution of the Lacanian vari­
ety, in which the self is actually constituted through desire - and, indeed, 
through a specifically fetishistic desire, as Georgia Johnston has noted (John­
ston 2007: 54). But what is truly significant here is not merely the creation of a 
desiring subject, but rather the fact that through desire this self called Gorgik 
is set free for the first time in his life. And he is free (indeed, there is a 'he' 
who can be free) because he has the power to give that freedom up willingly. It 
is important to note that the 'he' created in this way is not the self sought by 
modern humanism or the liberal state, for it was Lacanian desire that brought 
Gorgik into existence, rather than any rationalist Cartesian cogito. 
Perhaps the meaning of Gorgik, then, is freedom - at least for those "€itizens 
of Neveryon who recognise that the ethical wound of non-consensual slavery 
can be healed, in part, through the consensual exchange of erotic power. For 
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them, as for Gorgik, consent and desire are the razor-sharp blades which 
separate the ethical from the criminal, the erotic from the economic. 
As Neveryon awakens from its nightmare of non-consensual slavery, its S/M 
community flourishes. 'When I was free,' old Gorgik tells his would-be lover, 
'I learned that the power, the freedom, the pleasures you and I would indulge 
here tonight take place within the laws of a marginal society and an eccentric 
civility that allows us to grasp them, one and the other, with a stunning force 
and joy that whoever skulks after them like a slave cannot imagine' (Delany 
1987: 65). As always, Delany celebrates marginality: explicitly, the marginality 
of the kinky community, but also Gorgik's and perhaps Delany's own. If 
Delany's work has a utopian moment, it is surely this. In liberated Neveryon, 
Delany dreams of (and Gorgik remembers) a world in which power flows in 
accordance with the rules of civility and desire. It is a world which recognises 
the inevitability of power, and simply insists that such power be used ethically. 
Delany's work, like Butler's, embodies an attempt to describe a range of 
ethical power relations. The basic rule for both authors is that these relations 
must be consensual and desired. In this sense, their projects are fundamentally 
anarchistic. But Butler and Delany also represent the culmination of a theore­
tical tradition which began when Masoch added the concept of consent to the 
philosophy of erotic power, thus creating the category of practices and strate­
gies which would eventually come to be known as BDSM.9 Of course, Butler 
and Delany are interesting not merely because they make innovative cofltribu­
tions to kink theory via the medium of paraliterary genre fiction - though that 
certainly would be a remarkable enough achievement in its own right. Butler 
and Delany also expand, enhance and refine kink theory. Surely the most sig­
nificant contribution which Butler and Delany make to our understanding of 
po~ergesfrom their reappropriation of the master-slave dynamic. Rela­
tionships such as that of Doro and Anyanwu, or Gorgik and Small Sarg, show, 
as no amount of dialectical thinking ever could, that there is, after all, a kind 
of mutual reciprocity to such relationships. Most crucially, Butler and Delany 
give us, through the principle of consent and the practice of mutual desire, a 
set of tools which we may use to distinguish unethical slavery from ethical 
play-slavery. This may well turn out to be their lasting contribution to 
the philosophy of power and to the erotic practices which flow from that 
philosophy. 
Notes 
1 I use the phrase 'speculative fiction' rather than 'science fiction' so that Delany's 
Neveryon books, which describe vital components of his philosophy of power, may 
be included in the discussion. 
2 Sadly, Marxism is no help here. As Rubin points out, 'the issue of consent has been 
clouded by an overly hasty application of Marxian critiques of bourgeois contract 
theory to sex law and practice' (Rubin 1982: 222). So liberalism and Marxism share 
the suspicion that kink can't be consensual. But the anarchist concept of consent, 
which is broader, deeper and more open than those of most other political philo­
sophies, may have room for kink. 
3 Mistress Venus recognises that if there is a reactionary danger in what she does, that 
comes from the fact that her kink is inscribed within the structures of capitalist 
exchange. It is 'capitalism, not kink, that promotes 'body fascism' (Anarchist 
Federation 2002: 8). ' 
4 See White (1985) for a good account of the enormous dilemmas which female slaves 
faced, especially with respect to issues of sexuality and reproduction. 
5 In a well-known section from The Phenomenology of Mind entitled 'Lordship and 
Bondage', Hegel examined the richly intricate ways in which masters and slaves 
corne to depend upon one another. He concluded that since the consciousness of the 
master must always be mediated through the consciousness of the slave, the master 
cannot attain true independence, but only a 'dependent consciousness' (Hegel 1967: 
234ff). 
6 Moser and Kleinplatz (2005) have argued eloquently, however, that the American 
Psychiatric Association should remove sexual sadism and sexual masochism from its 
DSM. Although the paraphilias will likely remain in the DSM, the proposed revi­
sions to DSM-5 would distinguish paraphilias from paraphilic disorders. This is 
meant to reflect a consensus among clinicians that paraphilias such as sexual sadism 
or sexual masochism 'are not ipso facto psychiatric disorders' (American Psychiatric 
Association 2010). 
7 The emphasis which Delany places on negotiation is not surprising. Real world S/M 
communities, including the California communities with which I am most familiar, 
often regard negotiation as one of the most important skills. Jay Wiseman calls it 
the most important (Wiseman 1996: 57). Pat Califia points out that the community 
uses negotiation for everything from individual scenes to entire relationships (Califia 
2001: 25). 
8 It's interesting to note here that Lacan said of the analytic method that 'its opera­
tions are those of history' (Lacan 1968: 19). 
9 Masoch used the mechanism of the contract to explore the concept of consent in his 
famous erotic novel Venus in Furs (von Sacher-Masoch 1991 [1870]). 
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